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Abstract
This paper studies economic utilities and quality of service (QoS) in a two-sided non-neutral market where Internet service
providers (ISPs) charge content providers (CPs) for the content delivery. We propose new models that involve a CP, an ISP, end
users and advertisers. The CP may have either a subscription revenue model (charging end users) or an advertisement revenue
model (charging advertisers). We formulate the interactions between the ISP and the CP as a noncooperative game for the former
and an optimization problem for the latter. Our analysis shows that the revenue model of the CP plays a significant role in a
non-neutral Internet. With the subscription model, both the ISP and the CP receive better (or worse) utilities as well as QoS in the
presence of the side payment at the same time. With the advertisement model, the side payment impedes the CP from investing
on its contents.
Index Terms
etwork Non-neutrality, Side Payment, Nash Equilibrium, Bargainingetwork Non-neutrality, Side Payment, Nash Equilib-
rium, BargainingN
I. INTRODUCTION
Network neutrality, one of the foundations of Internet, is commonly admitted that ISPs must not discriminate traffic in order
to favor specific content providers [1]. However, the principle of network neutrality has been challenged recently. The main
reason is that new broadband applications cause huge amount of traffic without generating direct revenues for ISPs. Hence,
ISPs want to get additional revenues from CPs that are not directly connected to them. For instance, a residential ISP might
want to charge Youtube in order to give a premium quality of service to Youtube traffic. This kind of monetary flows, which
violate the principle of network neutrality, are called two-sided payment. We use the term side payment to name the money
charged by ISPs from CPs exclusively.
On the one hand, the opponents of network neutrality argue that it does not give any incentive for ISPs to invest in the
infrastructure. This incentive issue is even more severe in two cases: the one of tier-one ISPs that support a high load, but do
not get any revenue from CPs; and the one of 3G wireless networks that need to invest a huge amount of money to purchase
spectrum. On the other hand, advocates of network neutrality claim that violating it using side payment will lead to unbalanced
revenues among ISPs and CPs, thus a market instability.
Recent work addressed the problem of network neutrality from various perspectives [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9]. Among
these work, [2], [3], [4] are the closest to our work. Musacchio et al. [2] compare one-sided and two-sided pricing of ISPs.
However, they only investigate an example where the joint investments of CPs and ISPs bring revenue from advertisers to CPs.
In [3], the authors show how side payment is harmful for all the parties involved such as ISP and CP. Altman et al. in [4]
present an interesting bargaining framework to decide how much the ISP should charge the CP. However, their models might
give a biased conclusion by overlooking the end users’ sensitivity towards the prices of the CP and the ISP.
In this paper, we unravel the conflicts of the side payment in a more general context. We consider a simplified market
composed of one ISP, one CP, some advertisers, and a large number of end users. The ISP charges end-users based on their
usage and sets their QoS level according to the price paid. The CP can either have a subscription based or an advertisement
based revenue model. For the subscription based revenue model, the CP gets its revenue from the subscription paid by end-
users. End-users adapt their demand of content based on the price paid to the ISP and the CP. For the advertisement based
revenue model, the CP gets its revenue from advertisers. End users adapt the demand according to the price paid to the ISP
and the investment of CP on its contents.
Our work differs from related work [2], [3], [4] by: i) incorporating the QoS provided by the ISP, ii) studying different
revenue models of the CP, and iii) introducing the relative price sensitivity of end users in the subscription model. Especially,
in the subscription model, the relative price sensitivity decides whether the side payment is beneficial (or harmful) to the ISP
and the CP. Our finding contradicts the previous work (e.g. [3]) that argues that the side payment is harmful for all parties
involved. In the advertisement model, the ability of CP’s investment to attract the traffic of end users plays a key role. It
determines whether the side payment is profitable for the ISP and the CP. Our main contributions are the following.
• We present new features in the mathematical modeling that include the QoS, the relative price sensitivity of end-users,
and the CP’s revenues.
• We model the price competition between the ISP and the subscription based CP as a noncooperative game and analyze
the properties of the Nash equilibrium. The interaction between the ISP and the advertisement based CP is modeled as an
optimization problem. The optimal investment is shown to be a decreasing function of the side payment (from the CP to
the ISP).
• We utilize bargaining games to analyze how the side payment is determined.
The rest of this work is organized as follows. In section II, we model the economic behaviors of ISP, CP, advertisers and end
users. Section III and IV study the impact of side payment and how the ISP and the CP reach a consensus of side payment.
Section V presents numerical study to validate our claims. Section VII concludes this paper.
II. BASIC MODEL
In this section, we first introduce the revenue models of the ISP and the CP. Then, we formulate a game problem and an
optimization problem for the selfish ISP and the CP. Finally, we describe the bargaining games in a two-sided market.
A. Revenue Models
We consider a simplified networking market with four economic entities, namely the advertisers, the CP, the ISP and end
users. All the end users can access the contents of the CP only through the network infrastructure provided by the ISP. The ISP
collects subscription fees from end users. It sets two market parameters (ps, q) where ps is the non-negative price of per-unit
of demand, and q is the QoS measure (e.g. delay, loss or rejection probability). End users can decide whether to connect to
the ISP or not, or how much traffic they will request, depending on the bandwidth price and the QoS. The CP usually has
two revenue models, the user subscription and the advertisement from clicks of users. These two models, though sometimes
coexisting with each other, are studied separately in this work for clarity. The CP and the ISP interact with each other in a
way that depends on the CP’s revenue models. In the subscription based model, the CP competes with the ISP by charging
users a price pc per-unit of content within a finite time. End users respond to ps, pc and q by setting their demands elastically.
Though pc has a different unit as ps, it can be mapped from the price per content into the price per bps (i.e. dividing the price
of a content by its size in a finite time). The price pc not only can stand for a financial disutility, but also can represent the
combination of this disutility together with a cost per quality. Thus a higher price may be associated with some better quality
(this quality would stand for parameters different than the parameter q which we introduce later). Without loss of generality,
ps and pc can be positive or 0. For the advertisement based model, instead of charging users directly, the CP attracts users’
clicks on online advertisements. The more traffic demands end users generate, the higher the CP’s revenue.
To better understand network neutrality and non-neutrality, we describe the monetary flows among different components.
The arrows in Figure 1 represent the recipients of money. A “neutral network” does not allow an ISP to charge a CP for which
it is not a direct provider for sending information to this ISP’s users. On the contrary, monetary flow from a CP to an ISP
appears when “network neutrality” is violated. The ISP may charge the CP an additional amount of money that we denote
by f(D) = ptD where pt is the price of per-unit of demand. We denote by δ ∈ [0, 1] the tax rate of this transferred revenue
imposed by the regulator or the government to the ISP.
Fig. 1. Money flow of a non-neutral network.
We present market demand functions for the subscription and the advertisement based revenue models.
1) Subscription model: Let us define the average demand of all users by D that has
D(ps, pc, q) = max{0, D0 − α(ps + ρpc) + βq}, (1)
where D0, α, β and ρ are all positive constants. The parameter D0 reflects the total potential demand of users. The parameters
α and β denote the responsiveness of demand to the price and the QoS level of the ISP. The physical meaning of (1) can be
interpreted in this way. When the prices of the ISP and the CP increase (resp. decrease), the demand decreases (resp. increases).
If the QoS of the ISP is improved, the demand from users increases correspondingly. The parameter ρ represents the relative
sensitivity of pc to ps. We deliberately set different sensitivities of end users to the prices of the ISP and the CP because pc
and ps refers to different type of disutilities. If ρ = 1, the prices of the ISP and the CP are regarded as having the same effect
on D. When ρ > 1, users are more sensitive to the change of pc than ps. The positive prices ps and pc can not be arbitrarily
high. They must guarantee a nonnegative demand D.
We denote SCP to be the pricing strategy of the CP that has SCP = {pc : pc ≥ 0}. The utility (or revenue equivalently) of
the CP is expressed as
Ucp = (p
c
− p
t)D(ps, pc, q). (2)
Note that the variable D(ps, pc, q) is interchangeable with D all the time. Next, we present the utility of the ISP with QoS
consideration. We assume that the pricing strategy of the ISP is defined by SISP = {(ps, q) : ps ≥ 0; 0 < q ≤ qmax}. To
sustain a certain QoS level of users, the ISP has to pay the costs for operating the backbone, the last-mile access, and the
upgrade of the network, etc. Let u(D, q) be the amount of bandwidth consumed by users that depends on the demand D and
the QoS level q. We assume that u(D, q) is a positive, convex and strictly increasing function in the 2-tuple (D, q). This is
reasonable because a larger demand or higher QoS usually requires a larger bandwidth of the ISP. We now present a natural
QoS metric as the expected delay 1. The expected delay is computed by the Kleinrock function that corresponds to the delay of
M/M/1 queue with FIFO discipline or M/G/1 queue under processor sharing [10]. Similar to [10], instead of using the actual
delay, we consider the reciprocal of its square root, q = 1√
Delay
=
√
u(D, q)−D. Thus, the cost C(D, q) can be expressed
as C(D, q) = pru(D, q) = prD + prq
2
, where pr the price of per-unit of bandwidth invested by the ISP. Therefore, the cost
of the ISP is denoted by C(D, q) = pru(D, q). The utility of the ISP is defined as the difference between revenue and cost:
Uisp = (p
s − pr)D(ps, pc, q) + (1 − δ)ptD(ps, pc, q)− prq2. (3)
2) Advertisement model: Nowadays, a small proportion of CPs like Rapidshare and IPTV providers get their income from
end users. Most of other CPs provide contents for free, but collect revenues from advertisers. The demand from users is
transformed into attentions such as clicks or browsing of online advertisements. To attract more eyeballs, a CP needs to
invest money on its contents, incurring a cost c. The investment improves the potential aggregate demand D0 in return. Let
D0(c) be a concave and strictly increasing function of cost c. With abuse of notations we denote the strategy of the CP by
SCP = {c : c > 0}. Hence, the demand to the CP and the ISP is written as
D = D0(c)− αps + βq. (4)
The utility of the ISP is the same as that in (3). Next, we describe the economic interaction between advertisers and the CP.
There are M advertisers interested in the CP, each of which has a fixed budget B in a given time interval (e.g., daily, weekly
or monthly). An advertiser also has a valuation v to declare its maximum willingness to pay for each attention. The valuation
v is a random variable in the range [0, v]. Suppose that v is characterized by probability density function (PDF) x(v) and
cumulative distribution function (CDF) X(v). We assume that the valuations of all advertisers are independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d). Let pa be the price of per attention charged by the CP. We denote by Da(pa) the demand of attentions from
advertisers to the CP. Therefore, Da can be expressed as [11]
Da = MB · Prob(v ≥ pa)/pa = MB · (1−X(pa))/pa. (5)
When the CP increases pa, the advertisers will reduce their purchase of attentions. It is also easy to see that the revenue of
advertising, pa ·Da, decreases with regard to pa either. However, the attentions that the CP can provide is upper bounded by
the demand of users through the ISP. Then, we can rewrite Da as that in [11] by
Da = min{D, MB · (1−X(pa))/pa}. (6)
Correspondingly, subtracting investment from revenue, we obtain the utility of the CP by
Ucp = (p
a − pt)Da − c. (7)
Lemma 1: The optimal demand Da is a strictly decreasing function of pa if the pdf x(v) is nonzero in (0, v).
Proof: According to (7), there has X(pa + ǫ) > X(pa) where ǫ is an arbitrarily small positive constant. This is because
x(v) > 0 for v ∈ {0, v}. Hence, Da is a strictly decreasing function of pa.
To illustrate how the optimal pa is found, we follow [11] by drawing figure 2. The X-coordinate denotes the price pa and the
Y-coordinate denotes the CP’s revenue. The curve in red represents the revenue of the CP coming from advertisers. The optimal
price pa∗ is obtained at D = MB · (1 −X(pa∗))/pa∗. Here, we denote a function y(·) such that pa∗ = y(D). According to
the demand curve of attentions, y(·) is a decreasing function of D. The utility of the CP is a function of the demand D and
the cost c, i.e. Ucp = y(D) ·D − ptD − c.
1The QoS metric can be the functions of packet loss rate or expected delay etc.
Fig. 2. Revenue of the CP with regard to pa
B. Problem Formulation
Two economic entities, the ISP and the CP, want to maximize their utilities. With the subscription model, the strategy profile
of the ISP is to set the 2-tuple (ps, q) and that of the CP is to set pc. This is actually a game problem in which the ISP and the
CP compete by setting their prices. The ISP’s QoS is tunable. Thus, we call this game “QoS Agile Price competition”. With
the advertisement model, the strategy of the ISP is still the price paid by end users, while that of the CP is to determine the
investment level c. The ISP and the CP maximize their own utilities selfishly, but do not compete with each other. We name
this maximization as “Strategic Pricing and Investment”.
Definition 1: QoS Agile Price Competition In the subscription model, the CP charges users based on their traffic demands.
If the Nash equilibrium NE(1) = {ps∗, pc∗, q∗} exists, it can be expressed as
(G1) Uisp(ps∗, pc∗, q∗) = max{ps,q}∈SISP
Uisp(p
s, pc∗, q), (8)
Ucp(p
s∗, pc∗, q∗) = max
pc∈SCP
Ucp(p
s∗, pc, q∗). (9)
Definition 2: Strategic Pricing and Investment In the advertisement model, the ISP sets (ps, q) and the CP sets c to optimize
their individual utilities. If there exists an equilibrium {ps∗, q∗, c∗}, it can be solved by
(G2) Uisp(ps∗, q∗, c∗) = max{ps,q}∈SISP
Uisp(p
s, q, c∗), (10)
Ucp(p
s∗, q∗, c∗) = max
c∈SCP
Ucp(p
s∗, q∗, c). (11)
C. Bargaining Game
The side payment serves as a fixed parameter in the above two problems. A subsequent and important problem is how large
the side payment should be. When the ISP decides the side payment unilaterally, it might set a very high pt in order to obtain
the best utility. However, this leads to a paradox when the ISP sets ps and pt at the meantime. With the subscription based
model, if the ISP plays a strategy (pt, ps, q) and the CP plays pc, the noncooperative game leads to a zero demand and hence a
zero income. This can be easily verified by taking the derivative of Uisp over pt (also see [3]). In other words, the ISP cannot
set pt and ps simultaneously in the price competition. Similarly, with the advertisement based model, the ISP meets with the
same paradox. There are two possible ways, the Stackelberg game and the bargaining game, to address this problem. Their
basic principle is to let the ISP to choose pt and ps asynchronously. In this work, we consider the bargaining game in a market
where the ISP and the CP usually have certain marketing powers. Our analysis in this work is close to the one presented in
[4], but comes up with quite different observations.
We here analyze the bargaining games of the side payments that are played at different time sequences. The first one, namely
pre-bargaining, models the situation that the bargaining takes place before the problems (G1) or (G2). The second one, defined
as post-bargaining, models the occurrence of bargaining after the problems (G1) or (G2). Let γ ∈ [0, 1] be the bargaining
power of the ISP over the CP. They negotiate the transfer price pt determined by pt∗ = argmaxpt (Uisp)γ(Ucp)1−γ . Since
the utilities can only be positive, the optimal pt maximizes a virtual utility U
pt = argmax
pt
U = argmax
pt
(1− γ) logUcp + γ logUisp. (12)
We use (12) to find pt as a function of the strategies of the ISP and the CP.
III. PRICE COMPETITION OF THE SUBSCRIPTION MODEL
In this section, we first investigate how the relative price sensitivity influences the price competition between the ISP and
the CP. We then study the choice of side payment under the framework of bargaining games.
A. Properties of Price Competition
This subsection investigates the impact of side payment on Nash Equilibrium of the noncooperative game G1. Before eliciting
the main result, we show some basic properties of the subscription based revenue model.
Lemma 2: The utility of the CP, Ucp(ps, pc, q), in (2) is a finite, strictly concave function with regard to (w.r.t.) pc.
Proof: Taking the derivative of Ucp over pc, we obtain d
2Ucp
dpc2 = −2αρ < 0. The demand D is less than D0 + βqmax so that
ps, pc are finite. Hence, Ucp(ps, pc, q) is finite and strictly concave w.r.t. pc.
Similarly, we draw the following conclusion.
Lemma 3: The utility of the ISP, Uisp(ps, pc, q), in (3) is a finite, strictly concave function w.r.t. the 2-tuple (ps, q) if the
market parameters satisfy 4αpr > β2.
Proof: We compute the Hessian matrix of Uisp by
J =
[
d2Uisp
d(ps)2
d2Uisp
dpsdq
d2Uisp
dqdps
d2Uisp
dq2
]
=
[ −2α β
β −2pr
]
. (13)
When J is negative definite, there must have J1,1 < 0 and |J2,2| > 0, that is, 4αpr > β2. If the Hessian matrix if negative
definite, Uisp(ps, pc, q) is strictly concave with regard to the 2-tuple (ps, q).
For the QoS Agile Price Competition, we summarize our main results as below.
Lemma 4: When the ISP and the CP set their strategies selfishly,
• the Nash equilibrium (ps∗, pc∗, q∗) is unique;
• the QoS level q∗ at the NE is influenced by the side payment in the ways:
– improved QoS with ρ+ δ < 1;
– degraded QoS with ρ+ δ > 1;
– unaffected QoS with ρ+ δ = 1
if (ps∗, pc∗, q∗) satisfy ps∗ > 0, pc∗ > 0 and 0 < q∗ < qmax.
Proof: Because Ucp and Uisp are concave functions, the best responses of the ISP and the CP can be found either inside the
feasible region or at the boundary. In the beginning, we assume that the NE is not at the boundary. Then, the derivatives dUispdps ,
dUisp
dq and
dUcp
dpc are zero at the NE (p
s∗, pc∗, q∗),
dUisp
dps
= D − α(ps + (1− δ)pt − pr) = 0, (14)
dUisp
dq
= β(ps + (1− δ)pt − pr)− 2prq = 0, (15)
dUcp
dpc
= D − αρ(pc − pt) = 0, (16)
The best response functions of the ISP and the CP are written as
ps = max{0, 2p
r(D0 − αρpc − α(1 − δ)pt + αpr) + β2((1− δ)pt − pr)
4αpr − β2 }, (17)
pc = max{0, 2p
r(D0 − αps + αρpt) + β2(ps + (1 − δ)pt − pr)
4αρpr
} (18)
The above equations yield
q∗ =
β(D0 − αpr + αpt(1 − ρ− δ))
6αpr − β2 , (19)
pc∗ =
2pr(D0 − αpr + αpt(1− ρ− δ))
ρ(6αpr − β2) + p
t, (20)
ps∗ =
2pr(D0 − αpr + αpt(1− ρ− δ))
6αpr − β2 + p
r − (1− δ)pt, (21)
D∗ =
2prα(D0 − αpr + αpt(1− ρ− δ))
6αpr − β2 , (22)
From (19), we can see that the QoS is better (resp. worse) if ρ + δ < 1 (resp. ρ + δ > 1). The QoS is unchanged with side
payment when ρ equals to 1.
Next, we consider the case that the NE is at the boundary. The NE contains three variables so that there are many possibilities
of hitting the boundary. We will not enumerate all of them because the methods of analysis are almost the same. Here, we
study two examples when either q∗ in (19) or ps∗ in (21) are outside of Sisp.
Obviously, q∗ cannot be less than 0. This is because the demand at the NE is non-zero. If q∗ in (19) is larger than qmax,
dUisp
dq is positive at q = qmax when
dUisp
dps and
dUcp
dpc are zero (i.e. ps and pc are at the equilibrium). Thus, G1 is equivalent to
the game with a fixed QoS provision. The NE prices (ps∗, pc∗) are characterized by
pc∗ =
D0 + βqmax − αpr + α(1 − ρ− δ)pt
3αρ
+ pt,
ps∗ =
D0 + βqmax − αpr + α(1 − ρ− δ)pt
3α
+ pr − (1− δ)pt,
given pc∗ and ps∗ are positive.
If ps∗ in (21) is negative, dUispdps is negative at ps = 0 when dUispdq and dUcpdpc are zero The best strategy of the ISP is to set
ps∗ = 0 and q∗ = β((1−δ)p
t−pr)
2pr . The demand function turns into D = D0 − αρpc + βq∗. Thus, the best strategy of the CP is
pc∗ =
2pr(D0 + αρp
t) + β2((1− δ)pt − pr)
4αρpr
. (23)
Submitting (23) to (17), we validate that the best response of the ISP is ps∗ = 0.
By enumerating all the boundary conditions, we can always find that the NE is unique. When the NE is not at the boundary,
the QoS is better with side payment from the CP to the ISP if ρ+ δ < 1, and vice versa.
Lemma 4 means that that the QoS provision of the ISP is influenced by the side payment. We interpret the results by
considering ρ and δ separately. When users are indifferent to the price set by the ISP and that by the CP (i.e., ρ = 1), a
positive tax rate δ leads to the degradation of q in the presence of side payment. Next, we let δ be 0 and investigate the
impact of ρ. If users are more sensitive to the price of the ISP (i.e. ρ < 1), the side payment is an incentive of the ISP to
improve its QoS. Otherwise, charging side payment leads to an even poorer QoS of the ISP. According to (19)∼(22), if users
are more sensitive to the CP’s price, a good strategy of the ISP is to share its revenue with the CP so that the latter sets a
lower subscription fee.
B. Bargaining of Side Payment
To highlight the bargaining of side payment, we make the following two simplifications: i) the tax ratio δ is 0, and ii) pt
can be positive, zero or negative. We let δ = 0 because it turns out to have the similar effect as ρ. The above analysis has
shown that a negative pt might benefit both the ISP and the CP in some situations. Hence, we relax the feasible region of pt
in the bargaining game.
Pre-bargaining: In the pre-bargaining, pt is chosen based on the NE of the ISP and the CP. The equations (19)∼ (21) yield
the expression of U
U = 4 log
(
D0 − αpr + αpt(1− ρ)
)
+ constant . (24)
The utility U is increasing or decreasing in pt depending on the sign of (1− ρ). If ρ < 1, a positive pt improves not only the
QoS level of the ISP, but also the utilities of the ISP and the CP. As pt increases, ps decreases and pc increases consequently
until ps hits 0. Hence, in the pre-bargaining, ps∗ = 0. The prices pt∗ and pc∗ are computed by
pt∗ =
pr(4αpr + 2D0 − β2)
4αpr + 2ραpr − β2 . (25)
pc∗ =
2pr(D0 − αpr + αpt∗(1− ρ− δ))
ρ(6αpr − β2) + p
t∗. (26)
On the contrary, when ρ > 1, a negative pt benefits both of them. Then, pt∗ is a negative value such that pc∗ is 0. When
ρ = 1, the QoS and the utilities are unaffected by any pt. Also, the selection of pt is uninfluenced by the bargaining power γ.
Post-bargaining: For the post-bargaining, the ISP and the CP compete for the subscription of users first, knowing that they
will bargain over pt afterwards [4]. In brief, we find pt as a function of ps, pc and q first. Then, the ISP and the CP compete
with each other by setting the prices. To solve the maximization in (12), we let dUdpt be 0 and obtain
pt = γpc − (1− γ)(ps − pr) + (1− γ)prq2/D. (27)
Submitting (27) to Uisp, we rewrite the ISP’s utility by
Uisp = γ
(
(ps + pc − pr)(D0 − α(ps + ρpc) + βq)− prq2
)
. (28)
The utility of the CP is proportional to that of the ISP, i.e. Uispγ =
Ucp
1−γ . After knowing p
t
, we compute the derivatives dUispdps ,
dUisp
dq and
dUcp
dpc by
dUisp
dps
= γ(D − α(ps + pc − pr)), (29)
dUisp
dq
= γ(β(ps + pc − pr)− 2prq), (30)
dUcp
dpc
= (1− γ)(D − αρ(ps + pc − pr)). (31)
The best responses of Uisp and Ucp will not happen at the same time unless ρ = 1 or ps + pc − pr = 0. The condition
ps+ pc − pr = 0 does not hold because it leads to a zero demand D and zero utilities. When ρ is not 1, only one of (29) and
(31) is 0. Here, we consider the case ρ > 1. The utility Ucp reaches its maximum upon D = αρ(ps + pc − pr), while Uisp
is still strictly increasing w.r.t. ps. Thus, the ISP increases ps until the demand D is 0, which contradicts the condition of a
nonzero D. If D = α(ps + pc − pr), dUcpdpc is negative and dUispdps is 0. Then, the CP decreases pc until 0 and the ISP sets ps
to achieve its best utility accordingly. By letting (31) be 0, we can find (ps, q) at the Nash equilibrium
q∗ =
β(D0 − αpr)
4αpr − β2 and p
s∗ =
2pr(D0 − αpr)
4αpr − β2 + p
r.
The price of side payment, pt∗, is thus computed by
pt = −(1− γ)D0 − αp
r
2α
. (32)
When ρ = 1, ps∗ and pc∗ can be arbitrary values in their feasible region that satisfy ps∗ + pc∗ = pr + 2p
r(D0−αpr)
4prα−β2 . Similar
result has been shown in [4]. The analysis of ρ < 1 is omitted here since it can be conducted in the same way.
IV. PRICE, QOS AND INVESTMENT SETTINGS OF THE ADVERTISEMENT MODEL
This subsection analyzes how the side payment influences the optimal strategies of the ISP and the CP with the advertisement
model. The bargaining games are adopted to determine the amount of side payment. Compared with subscription based model,
the advertisement based model exhibits quite different behaviors.
A. Properties of Advertisement Mode
In general, the subscription model is limited to file storage CDNs, newspaper corporations, or some big content owners
such as movie producers. Most of content providers are not able to provide enough unique contents so that they do not charge
users, but make money from online advertisements. In this subsection, we present the general properties of the advertisement
model and a couple of case studies.
Lemma 5: For any feasible investment c of the CP, there exists a best strategy of the ISP, (ps, q). When c increases, the
price and the QoS (i.e. ps and q) become larger.
Proof: According to lemma 3, Uisp is a strictly concave function of 2-tuple (ps, q) in the feasible region. When c is determined,
the best response (ps, q) is derived accordingly.
The two-tuple (ps∗, q∗) at the NE is solved by
ps∗ =
2pr(D0(c) + α(1− δ)pt − αpr)
4αpr − β2 , (33)
q∗ =
β(D0(c) + α(1 − δ)pt − αpr)
4αpr − β2 , (34)
if ps∗ > 0. Since D0(c) is an increasing function, we can easily find that ps and q increase w.r.t. c.
In G2, the CP and the ISP do not compete with each other. On one hand, the ISP sets the two-tuple (ps, q) with the
observation of c. On the other hand, the CP adjusts c based on (ps, q). The investment of the CP brings more demand of end
users, which increases the revenues of not only the ISP, but also the CP. Hence, different from G1, the problem G2 is not a
game. Instead of studying the Nash equilibrium, we look into the best responses of the ISP and the CP in G2.
Theorem 1: There exists a unique best response, namely (ps∗, q∗, c∗), with the advertisement model if the revenue of the
CP, D · y(D), is a concave function w.r.t. D ≥ 0.
Proof: In the proof, we will show that the best response equations of the ISP and the CP have only one solution.
First, we assume that (ps∗, q∗, c∗) is not obtained at the boundary (i.e. ps∗ > 0, c∗ > 0 and 0 < q∗ < qmax). To get the
best response functions of the ISP, we derive Uisp over ps and q,
dUisp
dps
= D − α(ps + (1− δ)pt − pr) = 0, (35)
dUisp
dq
= β(ps + (1− δ)pt − pr)− 2prq = 0, (36)
Submitting (36) and (4) to (35), we obtain
dUisp
dps
=
(4αpr − β2)D − 2prα(D0(c) + α(1− δ)pt − αpr)
2αpr − β2 . (37)
The best response functions of the ISP give rise to the demand function
D =
2prα(D0(c) + α(1 − δ)pt − αpr)
4αpr − β2 . (38)
The derivative of Ucp over c is expressed as
dUcp
dc
= (Dy′(D) + y(D)− pt)dD0(c)
dc
− 1. (39)
Letting dUcpdc = 0, we obtain the following equation
dD0(c)
dc
=
1
Dy′(D) + y(D)− pt . (40)
Given that D0(c) is a strictly concave function of c, dD0(c)dc is decreasing in terms of c. The revenue of the CP, y(D)D, is
increasing and concave so that the expression 1Dy′(D)+y(D)−pt is a non-decreasing function of D. In the demand function
(40), the left side is a decreasing function of c, while the right side is non-decreasing w.r.t. D. This indicates that D is a
non-increasing of c. However, the demand of the ISP in (38) is an increasing function of c. Thus, the intersection of (38) and
(40) is the unique fixed point.
If (38) and (40) do not have an intersection in the range [0,∞), the best response (ps∗, q∗, c∗) might be at the boundary. We
consider the cases when each variable in the set (ps∗, q∗, c∗) is negative according to the fixed point equation composed of (38)
and (40). If q∗ < 0, ps > 0 and c∗ > 0, the demand at the equilibrium D∗ is negative, which is not true. Hence, we only need
to consider two cases of the fixed point equation from (38) and (40). i) {ps∗ < 0, c∗ > 0} and ii) {ps∗ > 0, c∗ < 0}. If the
intersection of (38) and (40) has ps∗ < 0 and c∗ > 0, the demand of the end users is D = D0(c)+βq = D0(c)+ β
2((1−δ)pt−pr)
2pr
and ps is chosen to be 0. Submitting the above expression of D to (40), we obtain a new fixed point equation w.r.t. c
dD0(c)
dc
=
1
D0(c) +
β2((1−δ)pt−pr)
2pr y
′(D0(c) +
β2((1−δ)pt−pr)
2pr ) + y(D0(c) +
β2((1−δ)pt−pr)
2pr )− pt
. (41)
Because the left side is a decreasing function of c and the right side is an increasing function of c, the solution in the range
[0,∞) is unique if it exists. For the case that the intersection of (38) and (40) has c∗ < 0 and ps∗ > 0, the CP sets c to be 0.
Then, the aggregate total demand is actually D0(0). The equations (38) and (35) yield
ps∗ =
2pr(D0(0) + α(1 − δ)pt − αpr)
4αpr − β2 + p
r − (1− δ)pt > 0 (42)
Note in the case ii), if c∗ derived from the fixed point equation (41) is less than 0, the CP will set the c∗ to be 0. Similarly,
in case iii), if ps∗ in (42) is less than 0, the ISP’s best strategy is to let ps∗ = 0.
This completes the proof.
Lemma 6: The side payment from the CP to the ISP leads to a decreased investment on the contents when the best strategy
(ps∗, q∗, c∗) has ps∗ > 0, q∗ > 0 and c∗ > 0.
Proof: Given that (ps∗, q∗, c∗) has ps∗ > 0, q∗ > 0 and c∗ > 0, the best strategy is not at the boundary. Let ptx and pty be
two prices of side payment that have ptx < pty. We will prove c∗x > c∗y by contradiction. Assume that c∗x ≤ c∗y when ptx < pty .
From (38) we obtain D∗x < D∗y . In the ride side of (40), Dy′(D) + D is decreasing with regard to D so that there has
D∗xy
′(D∗x) +D
∗
x − ptx > D∗yy′(D∗y) +D∗y − pty. Hence, we obtain dD0(c)dc |c=c∗x< dD0(c)dc |c=c∗y . Given dD0(c)dc is a decreasing
function of c, there has c∗x > c∗y , which contradicts to the assumption c∗x < c∗y . Therefore, the optimal investment of CP is an
decreasing function of the price of side payment.
B. Case Study
In this subsection, we aim to find the best strategies of the ISP and the CP when the valuation of advertisers follows a
uniform distribution or a normal distribution.
Recall that the potential aggregate demand of users, D0(c), is strictly increasing and concave w.r.t c. When the CP invests
money on contents, D0 becomes larger, while its growth rate shrinks. Here, we assume a log function of D0(c),
D0(c) = D
0
0 +K log(1 + c), (43)
where the constant K denotes the ability that the CP’s investment brings the demand. The nonnegative constant D00 denotes
the potential aggregate demand of end users when c is zero (the CP only provides free or basic contents). The utility of the
ISP remains unchanged.
Uniform Distribution: Suppose v follows a uniform distribution in the range [0, v]. Then, the CDF X(pa) is expressed as p
a
v .
The optimal price pa is obtained when D = MBpa · (1− p
a
v ) in the range [0, v] (see subsection II-A2). Alternatively, there has
pa =
MBv
MB +Dv
. (44)
The above expressions yield the utility of the CP by
Ucp =
MBvD
MB +Dv
− c− ptD. (45)
Deriving Ucp over c, we obtain
dUcp
dc
= (
(MB)2v
(MB +Dv)2
− pt) · K
1 + c
− 1. (46)
We let (46) be 0 and get
c = K(
(MB)2v¯
(MB +Dv¯)2
− pt)− 1. (47)
The rule of the ISP to decide (ps, q) is the same as that in the subscription model, except that the aggregate demand is not a
constant, but a function of c,
c = exp(
D
2prα (4p
rα− β2)−D00 + αpr − (1− δ)ptα
K
)− 1. (48)
Note that (47) is strictly decreasing and (48) is strictly increasing. They constitute a fixed-point equation for the 2-tuple (D∗, c∗).
When D approaches infinity, (47) is negative while (48) is positive. When D is zero, if (47) is larger than (48), there exists a
unique fixed-point solution. In this fixed point, the ISP and the CP cannot benefit from changing their strategy unilaterally. We
can solve c∗ and D∗ numerically using a binary search. If (47) is smaller than (48) when D is 0, the best strategy of the CP
is exactly D = 0. The physical interpretation is that the increased revenue from advertisers cannot compensate the investment
on the contents. Once D∗ and c∗ are derived, we can solve ps∗ and q∗ subsequently. In this fixed-point equation, pt greatly
influences the optimal investment c∗. When pt grows, (47) and (48) decrease at the mean time. The crossing point of two
curves, (47) and (48), may shift toward the direction of smaller c. Intuitively, the contents of the CP become less when the
ISP charges a positive pt.
Next, we analyze the best strategies of the ISP and the CP when they are at the boundary. Note that we compute ps∗ and
c∗ numerically through (47) and (48). They might be negative, thus violating their feasible ranges. If the computed ps∗ < 0,
the derivative dUispdps cannot be 0 with p
s = 0. When the ISP set its price ps∗ to be 0, the demand function is rewritten as
D = D00 +K log(1 + c) + βq = D
0
0 +K log(1 + c) +
β((1 − δ)pt − pr)
2pr
. (49)
Submitting (49) to (47), we obtain a new fixed point equation in term of c. The best investment of the CP is obtained by
solving this fixed point equation. Similarly, we consider the case that c∗ computed from (47) and (48) is less than 0. Due to
the constraint c ≥ 0, the best strategy of the CP is to set c∗ = 0. When c∗ is 0, the demand to the ISP is expressed as
D = D00 − αps + βq. (50)
By letting dUispdps and
dUisp
dq be 0, the best strategy of the ISP is represented as the following
ps∗ =
2pr(D0 + (1 − δ)αpt − αpr)
4prα− β2 − (1− δ)p
t + pr, (51)
q∗ =
β(D0 + (1− δ)αpt − αpr)
4prα− β2 . (52)
Normal Distribution: Suppose that v obeys a normal distribution with the mean µ > 0 and the deviation σ2. The valuation
v ranges from −∞ to ∞ (i.e. v = −∞ and v =∞) 2. The probability distribution function x(v) is expressed as
x(v) =
1√
2πσ2
e−
(v−µ)2
2σ2 (53)
The CDF of v is computed by X(v) =
∫ v
−∞ x(t)dt. Since the optimal price p
a∗ (or y(D) alternatively) is obtained at
D = MB · (1 −X(pa∗))/pa∗, we obtain pa∗ as an implicit function of D, (denoted by pa)
D =
MB√
2πσ2pa∗
∫ ∞
pa∗
e−
(t−µ)2
2σ2 dt. (54)
For simplicity, we rewrite Ucp as the following
Ucp =
MB√
2πσ2
∫ ∞
pa∗
e−
(t−µ)2
2σ2 dt− c− ptD. (55)
Let (ps∗, q∗, c∗) be a set of best strategies of the ISP and the CP (computed from their best response functions). To prove the
uniqueness of (ps∗, q∗, c∗), we show that y(D)D is a concave function w.r.t. D.
Lemma 7: The revenue of the CP, y(D)D, is a concave function of D when the valuation v follows a normal distribution
with the mean µ > 0 and the variance σ2.
Proof: Denote a function F (D) = y(D)D to be the revenue of the CP. To prove the concavity of F (D), we need to show
d2F (D)
dD2 ≤ 0. We derive F (D) over D and obtain
dF (D)
dD
=
dF (D)
dpa∗
· dp
a∗
dD
=
dF (D)
dpa∗
· ( dD
dpa∗
)−1
=
e−
(pa∗−µ)2
2σ2 (pa∗)2
e−
(pa∗−µ)2
2σ2 pa∗ +
∫∞
pa∗ e
− (pa∗−µ)2
2σ2 dt
.
We next compute the derivative d
2F (D)
dD2 ,
d2F (D)
dD2
=
d(dF (D)dD )
dD
=
d(dF (D)dD )
dpa∗
· ( dD
dpa∗
)−1
= −
√
2piσ2
MB (p
a∗)3e−
(pa∗−µ)2
2σ2
(e−
(pa∗−µ)2
2σ2 pa∗ +
∫∞
pa∗ e
− (pa∗−µ)2
2σ2 dt)3
×
(
2pa∗e−
(pa∗−µ)2
2σ2 + (2− p
a∗(pa∗ − µ)
σ2
)
∫ ∞
pa∗
e−
(pa∗−µ)2
2σ2 dt
)
.(56)
Because pa∗ is an implicit function of D in (54), pa∗ is positive. Otherwise, the demand D from the ISP is negative, which
is not feasible. Let us denote functions Ω(pa∗) and Ψ(pa∗) by
Ω(pa∗) = 2pa∗e−
(pa∗−µ)2
2σ2 + (2− p
a∗(pa∗ − µ)
σ2
)
∫ ∞
pa∗
e−
(pa∗−µ)2
2σ2 dt
and
Ψ(pa∗) = e−
(pa∗−µ)2
2σ2 pa∗ +
∫ ∞
pa∗
e−
(pa∗−µ)2
2σ2 dt
respectively. Here, we will show that Ω(pa∗) and Ψ(pa∗) are positive for pa∗ > 0. The derivative of Ω(pa∗) over pa∗ is
expressed as
dΩ
dpa∗
= −p
a∗(pa∗ − µ)
σ2
e−
(pa∗−µ)2
2σ2 − 2p
a∗ − µ
σ2
∫ ∞
pa∗
e−
(pa∗−µ)2
2σ2 dt < 0.
for any pa ≥ µ. Hence, Ω(pa∗) is strictly decreasing for pa∗ > µ. When pa∗ goes to infinity, Ω(pa∗) approaches 0, i.e.
limpa∗→∞ Ω(pa∗) = 0. Because Ω(pa∗) is a strictly decreasing function, we can infer Ω(pa∗) > 0 for any positive pa∗ > µ.
According to the expression of Ω(pa∗), it is easy to observe Ω(pa∗) > 0 for any pa∗ that has 0 < pa∗ ≤ µ. Thus, Ω(pa∗) is
positive for any positive pa∗. We derive Ψ(pa∗) over pa∗ subsequently,
dΨ
dpa∗
= −p
a∗(pa∗ − µ)
σ2
· e− (p
a∗
−µ)2
2σ2 .
2Truncated normal distribution is usually adopted in econometrics. In order to keep mathematical simplicity, we consider a normal distribution.
From the above expression, we can see that Ψ(pa∗) is increasing for pa∗ < µ and decreasing for pa∗ > µ. Note that there have
Ψ(0) > 0 and limpa∗→∞Ψ(pa∗) = 0. We can see that Ψ(pa∗) is positive in the range [0,∞). Because Ψ(pa∗) and Ω(pa∗)
are positive for pa∗ > 0, d
2F (D)
dD2 < 0 so that F (D) is a concave function of D, (D > 0).
The concavity of y(D)D implies the uniqueness of the best strategies of the ISP and the CP. We then show how to find
(ps∗, q∗, c∗) numerically. The analysis of the normal distribution is carried out based on the assumption that (ps∗, q∗, c∗) is
not at the boundary first. Then, (ps∗, q∗, c∗) is the solution of equations dUispdps = 0,
dUisp
dq = 0 and
dUcp
dc = 0. According to
(54), the inverse function D−1(pa) does not have a close form expression. Hence, the derivative dUcpdc contains the variables
c and pa∗,
Ucp
dc
=
Ucp
dpa∗
· dp
a∗
dD
· dD
dc
=
Ucp
dpa∗
· ( dD
dpa∗
)−1 · dD
dc
=
( e− (pa∗−µ)22σ2 (pa∗)2
e−
(pa∗−µ)2
2σ2 pa∗ +
∫∞
pa∗
e−
(pa∗−µ)2
2σ2 dt
− pt
)
· K
1 + c
− 1. (57)
By letting dUcpdc be 0, we obtain
c = K
( e− (pa∗−µ)22σ2 (pa∗)2
e−
(pa∗−µ)2
2σ2 pa∗ +
∫∞
pa∗
e−
(pa∗−µ)2
2σ2 dt
− pt
)
− 1. (58)
The best response of the ISP with the normal distribution is the same as that with the uniform distribution. We submit the
demand function in (54) to (48) and obtain
D =
MB√
2πσ2pa∗
∫ ∞
pa∗
e−
(t−µ)2
2σ2 dt
=
2prα
(
D00 +K log(1 + c)− αpr + (1− δ)ptα
)
4prα− β2 . (59)
The equations (58) and (59) form a fixed point equation of pa∗ and c.
The proof of Lemma 7 shows that c an increasing function of pa∗ in (58). While in (59) c is a decreasing function of pa.
Therefore, the solution of this fixed point is unique if it is not at the boundary.
Next, we investigate the cases where the best strategies are at the boundary. With the advertisement model, the boundary
cases include i) {ps∗ = 0, c > 0}, ii) {ps∗ > 0, c = 0}, and iii) {ps∗ = 0, c = 0}. If the fixed point solution computed from
(58) and (59) has ps∗ < 0, then the derivative dUispdps is not zero at ps = 0. The demand function D is then expressed as
D =
MB√
2πσ2pa∗
∫ ∞
pa∗
e−
(t−µ)2
2σ2 dt = D00 +K log(1 + c) +
β((1 − δ)pt − pr)
2pr
. (60)
Here, (58) and (60) consist of a new fixed point equation. The optimal strategies of the ISP and the CP is the solution of this
fixed point equation. If the fixed point solution computed from (58) and (59) has c∗ < 0, then the derivative dUcpdc is not zero
c = 0. The best response of the ISP is obtained at c∗ = 0. We can use (51) and (52) to compute (ps∗, q∗).
C. Bargaining of Side Payment
In the bargaining game of advertisement model, pt can also be negative. We assume that the valuation v follows a uniform
distribution, and makes the same simplifications as those in subsection III-B.
Pre-bargaining: The pre-bargaining method determines pt by maximizing the virtual utility U ,
pt = argmax
pt
U = argmax
pt
(1 − γ) log(Ucp(ps∗, q∗, c∗)) + γ log(Uisp(ps∗, q∗, c∗))
where the superscript ∗ denotes the value of a variable at the equilibrium. In the beginning, we assume that pt∗ does not cause
ps∗, c∗ or q∗ outside of their feasible ranges. Submitting (45) to (61), we obtain
pt = argmax
pt
(1− γ) log ( MBv¯D∗
MB + v¯D∗
− c∗ − ptD∗)+ γ log ((ps∗ + pt − pr)D∗ − prq∗2)
= argmax
pt
(1− γ) log ( MBv¯D∗
MB + v¯D∗
− c∗ − ptD∗)+ 2γ logD∗ + constant
= argmax
pt
(1− γ) log ( MBv¯D∗
MB + v¯D∗
−K( M
2B2v¯
(MB + v¯D∗)2
− pt) + 1− ptD∗)
+2γ logD∗ + constant . (61)
Recall that in the pre-bargaining of the subscription model, pt∗ is independent of the bargaining power γ. When the ISP
charges the CP pt for per-unit of demand, either ps∗ or pc∗ is zero, depending on ρ. Different from that of the subscription
model, the optimal side payment pt∗ relies on the bargaining parameter γ.
If pt∗ causes c∗ < 0 or ps∗ < 0, we need to replace the Uisp and Ucp by the corresponding expressions in which the best
strategies of the ISP and the CP are at the boundary (see subsection II-A2). Using the same method, we can find the optimal
side payment.
Post-bargaining:
In the post-bargaining of advertisement model, the bargaining of pt happens after the ISP and the CP select their best
policies. They negotiate pt to maximize the virtual utility U ,
pt = argmax
pt
U = argmax
pt
(1− γ) log ((y(D)− pt)D − c)+ γ log ((ps + pt − pr)D − prq2). (62)
Deriving U over pt and letting the derivative be 0, we obtain
pt = γy(D)− γc
D
− (1− γ)(ps − pr) + (1− γ)p
rq2
D
. (63)
Submitting (63) to Uisp, we have
Uisp = γ
(
(y(D) + ps − pr)D − c− prq2) (64)
and Ucp = 1−γγ Uisp. After p
t is determined, the ISP and the CP maximize their individual utilities. Here, our study is limited
to the cast that the best strategy (ps∗, q∗, c∗) satisfies ps∗ > 0, q∗ > 0 and c∗ > 0. We solve (ps∗, q∗, c∗) by letting the
derivatives be 0 because it is not at the boundary. Here, Ucpdc is expressed as
dUcp
dc
= (1 − γ)(( M2B2v¯
(MB + v¯D)2
+ ps − pr) K
1 + c
− 1) = 0. (65)
The derivatives Uispdps and
Ucp
dps are
dUisp
dps
= γ
(
D − α( M
2B2v¯
(MB + v¯D)2
+ ps − pr)) = 0, (66)
dUisp
dq
= γ
(
β(
M2B2v¯
(MB + v¯D)2
+ ps − pr)− 2prq) = 0. (67)
The equations (65) and (66) give rise to
D =
α(1 + c)
K
. (68)
The equations (66), (67) together with the demand function (4) yield
(4αpr − β2)D
2αpr
− M
2B2v¯α
(MB + v¯D)2
= D00 − αpr +K log(1 + c). (69)
The best investment c∗ is the solution of the fixed point equation composed of (68) and (69) if c∗ ≥ 0. From (68) and (69),
D is strictly increasing w.r.t. c if c and D are positive. But D increases linearly in (68) and logarithmically in (69). In order
to prove the uniqueness of the best strategy, we need to show that D computed by (69) is larger than that computed by (68).
When c is 0, the demand D is αK . We then replace D by
α
K in (69). If there has (4αp
r−β2)
2Kpr − M
2B2v¯α
(MB+v¯α/K)2 −D00+αpr < 0, the
demand D computed by (69) is larger than that computed by (68). Given the above inequality, the best strategy (ps∗, q∗, c∗)
is unique. Otherwise, there might have two fixed point solutions, in which one of them bring more utilities to the ISP and the
CP than the other.
V. EVALUATION
We present some numerical results to reveal how the QoS, prices of the ISP and the CP, as well as their utilities evolve
when the price of side payment changes. The impact of bargaining power on the choice of side payment is also illustrated.
Subscription Model: We consider a networking market where the demand function is given by D = 200−10(ps+ρpc)+0.5q.
The operational cost of per-unit of bandwidth is set to pr = 1. Two situations, ρ = 0.5 and ρ = 1.5, are evaluated. The tax rate
δ is set to 0 for simplicity. As is analyzed, the side payment benefits the ISP and the CP depending on whether ρ is greater
than 1 or not. Figure 3(a) shows that pc increases and ps decreases when pt becomes larger. In figure 3(b), pt has different
impacts on utilities of the ISP and the CP. When ρ > 1, end users are more sensitive to the change of pc than ps. A positive
pt leads to the increase of pc, causing a tremendous decrease of demand. Hence, both the ISP and the CP lose revenues w.r.t.
a positive pt. Figure 3(c) further shows that a positive pt yields a better QoS if ρ < 1 and a worse QoS if ρ > 1.
Next, the ISP and the CP bargain with each other to determine pt. We relax the choice of pt so that it can be negative.
In the pre-bargaining game, pt is independent of the bargaining power γ. The optimal pt is obtained when ps∗ decreases to
0, its lower bound. We evaluate pt by changing ρ and α in figure 3(d). When ρ increases from 0.2 to 2, pt decreases until
it becomes negative. A negative pt means that the ISP needs to transfer revenue to the CP instead. When ρ = 1, pt can be
an arbitrary value as long as ps∗ and pc∗ are nonnegative. Figure 3(d) also shows that a larger α results in a smaller absolute
value of pt.
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Fig. 3. Numerical study for the subscription based revenue model
Advertisement Model: In the advertisement model, we consider the demand function D = K log(1+ c)−10ps+0.5q. The
coefficient K reflects the efficiency of the CP’s investment to attract end users. The valuation of each click/browsing follows
uniform distribution in the range [0, 10]. The total budget of advertisers is set to 1000. We conduct two sets of experiments.
The first one is to evaluate the impact of side payment on the best strategies of the ISP and the CP. The second one is to find
the optimal pt in the pre-bargaining game. In figure 4(a), the CP’s investment is a decreasing function of pt. When pt is large
enough, c reduces to 0. Figure 4(b) illustrates the utility of the CP when when pt and K change. The CP’s utility increases
first and then decreases with K = 10 when pt increases. For the cases K = 20 and 30, the increase of pt usually leads to
the decrease of revenues. In figure 4(c), the utility of the ISP with K = 10 and 20 increases first and then decreases when pt
grows. These curves present important insights on the interaction between the CP and the ISP. If the contents invested by the
CP can bring a large demand, the side payment is not good for both the ISP and the CP. On the contrary, when the efficiency
K is small, the CP can obtain more utility by paying money to the ISP.
Figure 4(d) shows the relationship among K , γ and pt in the pre-bargaining game. Different from the subscription model,
pt depends on the bargaining power γ. One can observe that pt is a decreasing function of K , and is negative when K is large.
This is to say, the ISP needs to pay money to the CP so that the CP can invest more on its contents. We also find that the
optimal pt is a decreasing function of γ. This is because the ISP is less powerful in negotiating with the CP when γ decreases.
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VI. RELATED WORK
There is one particular economic issue that is at the heart of the conflict over network neutrality. Hahn and Wallsten [1]
write that net neutrality “usually means that broadband service providers charge consumers only once for Internet access, do
not favor one content provider over another, and do not charge content providers for sending information over broadband lines
to end users.”
This motivates us to study [3] the implications of being non-neutral and of charging the content providers. Using non-
cooperative game theoretic tools, we showed that if one ISP has the power to impose payments on CPs, not only the end users
suffer, but also the ISP’s performance degrades. More precisely, we show that the only possible equilibrium (characterized by
prices) induces zero demand from the users. This phenomenon does not occur if the price that the CP is requested to pay to
the ISP is fixed by some regulators. In [4] we focus on mechanisms based on the Nash bargaining (also known as proportional
fairness [12]) paradigm (which is known in the network engineering context as the proportional fair assignment). It is the
unique way of transferring utilities that satisfies a well known set of four axioms [13] related to fairness. We use a weighted
version of this concept that takes into account the fact that one player may have more weights than the other one in deciding
the amount of side payment. It is introduced in the context of network neutrality by [6]. She analyzes the investment of a
CP to duopoly ISPs for better quality of service. The bargaining powers of the CP and the ISPs have been shown to be a
knob of investment policies. In [14], we explore the effects of content-specific (i.e. not application neutral) pricing, including
multiple CPs providing different types of content. Also, we consider competition among multiple providers of the same type
and includes different models with consumer stickiness (or loyalty).
Some other recent work includes [15], [5], [7], [2], [17], [16]. Authors in [15] employ the theory of product-line restriction
and find that network neutrality potentially harms the welfare of small CPs. Economides et. al. in [5], on the contrary, find
that regulated network neutrality has a better welfare than the two-sided pricing (i.e. pricing both CPs and end users). This
contradictory conclusion is drawn on the assumption that CPs’ contents are homogeneous. In [7], the authors study the effects
of service discrimination on investment incentives for the ISPs and the CPs, and their implications for social welfare. They
show that net neutrality might not necessarily prohibit the investment of the ISPs, and the discriminatory regime may weaken
the investment incentive of the CPs. [2] compares one-sided and two-sided pricing of the ISPs in a network where the joint
investments of the CPs and the ISPs bring revenue from advertisers to the CPs. Other references that explored the fact that the
consumer pays two entities for one good (for accessing contents through the Internet) are [17], [16]. They study the impact of
this competition on the users as well as on the level of investment in the infrastructure.
The side payment from the CP to the ISP is expected to be financed by the income from the users and publicity. Cooperative
games is a well established scientific area that provides us with tools for designing such mechanisms which, moreover, possess
some fairness properties. In [8], [9] the Shapley value (which is known to have some fairness properties [18]) has been used
for deciding how revenues from users should be split between the service and the content providers.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have studied the two-sided ISP pricing in a non-neutral market composed of one ISP, one CP, a number
of advisers and end users. We first answer under what situations the side payment charged by the ISP is beneficial for the
ISP (or the CP). Then, we study how the price of side payment is determined. Different from existing work, our models take
account of three important features, the relative price sensitivity, the revenue models, and the QoS provided by the ISP. These
new features give rise to quite different results, enabling us to understand the two-sided pricing comprehensively. With the
subscription model, the relative price sensitivity determines whether the ISP should charge the side payment from the CP
or not. With the advertisement model, the charge of side payment depends on the ability of the CP’s investment to attract
the demand. Our work also has a couple of potential limitations. For instance, the usage based pricing is usually adopted by
wireless ISPs, but not the wireline ISPs that use the xDSL technology. Sometimes, the CPs might obtain revenue from both
end users and the advertisers, which is not considered here. Our future work would address these limitations.
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